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Abstract
This study develops an R&D-based growth model that features
both vertical and horizontal innovation to shed some light on the cur-
rent debate on whether patent protection stimulates or sties innova-
tion. Specically, we analyze the growth and welfare e¤ects of patent
protection in the form of prot division between sequential innovators
along the quality ladder. We show that patent protection has asym-
metric e¤ects on vertical innovation (i.e., quality improvement) and
horizontal innovation (i.e., variety expansion). Maximizing the incen-
tives for vertical (horizontal) innovation requires a prot-division rule
that assigns the entire ow prot to the entrant (incumbent) of a qual-
ity ladder. In light of this nding, we argue that in order to properly
analyze the growth and welfare implications of patent protection, it is
important to disentangle its di¤erent e¤ects on vertical and horizontal
innovation.
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1 Introduction
Since the early 1980s, the patent system in the US has undergone substantial
changes.1 As a result of this patent reform, the strength of patent protec-
tion in the US has increased. For example, Park (2008) provides an index of
patent rights on a scale of 0 to 5 (a larger number implies stronger protec-
tion) and shows that the strength of patent rights in the US increases from
3.8 in 1975 to 4.9 in 2005.2 In other words, patentholders can now better
protect their inventions against imitation as well as subsequent innovation. In
an environment with sequential innovation, these overlapping patent rights
across sequential innovators lead to contrasting e¤ects on the incentives for
R&D. On one hand, the traditional view suggests that stronger patent rights
improve the protection for existing inventions and hence increase its value to
the patentholders. On the other hand, the recent argument against patent
protection suggests that stronger patent rights stie innovation by conferring
too much power onto existing patentholders, who use this power to extract
surplus from subsequent innovators rather than providing more innovation.3
In this study, we develop a simple growth model to shed some light on this
current debate on whether patent protection stimulates or sties innovation.4
We argue that the two seemingly contradictory views of patent protection
are in fact two sides of the same coin. In other words, strengthening exist-
ing patentholdersprotection against future innovations inevitably decreases
subsequent innovatorsincentives for R&D and leads to contrasting e¤ects on
vertical innovation (i.e., quality improvement within an industry)5 and hor-
izontal innovation (i.e., variety expansion that gives rise to new industries).
1See Gallini (2002), Ja¤e (2000) and Ja¤e and Lerner (2004) for a detailed discussion
on these changes in patent policy.
2The index in Park (2008) is an updated version of the index in Ginarte and Park (1997),
who examine ve categories of patent rights and assign a score from zero to one to each
category. These ve categories are patent duration, coverage, enforcement mechanisms,
restrictions on patent scope, and membership in international treaties.
3See, for example, Bessen and Meurer (2008), Bodrin and Levine (2008) and Ja¤e and
Lerner (2004).
4ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004), Furukawa (2007), Horii and Iwaisako (2007), Acs
and Sanders (2009) and Cozzi and Galli (2009) also analyze the contrasting e¤ects of
patent protection on innovation in R&D-based growth models. Later on, we will discuss
how the present study relates to and di¤ers from these interesting studies.
5In this study, we model quality improvements in the form of more e¢ cient production
methods. However, the same result would apply to a model with the introduction of
higher-quality products.
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In light of this nding, we argue that in order to properly analyze the growth
and welfare implications of patent protection, it is important to disentangle
its di¤erent e¤ects on vertical and horizontal innovation. In fact, there is
an on-going debate among policy analysts as to whether patent protection
promotes horizontal innovation at the expense of vertical innovation.6
To analyze the asymmetric e¤ects of patent protection on vertical and
horizontal innovation, this study develops an R&D-based growth model that
features both quality improvement and variety expansion. Within this frame-
work, we derive the growth and welfare e¤ects of patent protection in the
form of prot division between sequential innovators within the same indus-
try. We nd that there is a tension between maximizing the incentives for
vertical innovation and that of horizontal innovation. On one hand, max-
imizing the incentives for vertical innovation requires a prot-division rule
that allows the entrant to keep all the prot. On the other hand, maxi-
mizing the incentives for horizontal innovation requires a prot-division rule
that assigns as much prot to the incumbent (i.e., the previous innovator) as
possible. Given that economic growth is driven by both quality improvement
and variety expansion, there is a growth-maximizing prot-division rule. Fur-
thermore, the prot-division rule has an additional level e¤ect on welfare, so
that there also exists a welfare-maximizing prot-division rule that is gener-
ally di¤erent from the growth-maximizing rule. Calibrating the model and
simulating the transition dynamics, we nd that an increase in the share
of prot assigned to the incumbent would stie vertical innovation and de-
crease the overall growth rate despite an increase in horizontal innovation.
This nding is consistent with the recent concerns on the innovation-stiing
e¤ects of stronger patent rights. However, we also nd that social welfare
may increase despite the lower growth rate suggesting that a proper wel-
fare analysis should investigate beyond the e¤ects of patent protection on
innovation and growth.
Nordhaus (1969) is the seminal study on the optimal design of patent pro-
tection, and he shows that the optimal patent length should balance between
the social benet of innovation and the social cost of monopolistic distortion.
Scotchmer (2004) provides a comprehensive review on the subsequent de-
velopment in the patent-design literature. In this literature, an interesting
and important policy lever is forward patent protection (i.e., leading patent
6See, for example, http://www.reasonforliberty.com/reason/patents-horizontal-vs-
vertical-innovation.html
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breadth) that gives rise to the division of prot between sequential inno-
vators.7 A recent study by Segal and Whinston (2007) analyzes a general
antitrust policy lever that has a similar e¤ect as the division of prot between
the entrant and the incumbent. They show that in an innite-horizon model
with leapfrogging, protecting the entrant at the expense of the incumbent has
a frontloading e¤ect that potentially increases innovation. However, they also
note that their result does not apply to the rst rm of a quality ladder. The
present study complements their analysis by (i) taking into account the e¤ect
of prot division on variety inventors (i.e., the rst rm of each variety) and
(ii) performing the analysis in a growth-theoretic framework that allows for
an explicit consideration of economic growth and social welfare.
ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004) merge the patent-design literature
and the R&D-based growth literature by incorporating leading breadth into
a quality-ladder growth model with overlapping patent rights across sequen-
tial innovators. In their model, for a given rate of innovation, increasing
the share of prot assigned to the current innovator (i.e., the entrant of a
quality ladder) while holding leading breadth constant would increase the
incentives for innovation. Intuitively, along the quality ladder, every inno-
vator is rstly an entrant and then becomes an incumbent whose patent is
infringed upon. Therefore, setting aside the issues of prot growth and dis-
counting, every innovator receives the same amount of prot over the lifetime
of an invention. Given that the real interest rate is higher than the growth
rate in their model, delaying the receipt of prots reduces the present value
of the income stream. As a result, the complete frontloading prot-division
rule (i.e., allowing the entrant to keep all the prot) tends to maximize the
market value of an invention and hence the incentives for R&D.8 However,
in a model with both vertical and horizontal innovation, this result may no
longer hold. In this case, the inventor of a new variety is the rst innovator
on a quality ladder; therefore, assigning a larger share of prot to the incum-
bent would tend to increase horizontal innovation. Given that quality im-
provement and variety expansion are both important channels for economic
growth, the growth-maximizing prot-division rule should balance between
the asymmetric e¤ects of prot division on vertical and horizontal innova-
tion. Furthermore, given that growth maximization does not necessarily give
7See, for example, Green and Scotchmer (1995) and Gallini and Scotchmer (2002) for
a discussion on the importance of this policy lever.
8See, for example, Chu (2009) for a quantitative analysis on the prot-division rule in
the ODonoghue-Zweimuller model.
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rise to welfare maximization, we characterize both the growth-maximizing
and welfare-maximizing prot-division rules.
This study also relates to other growth-theoretic studies on patent policy.
Judd (1985) provides the seminal dynamic analysis on patent length, and he
nds that an innite patent length maximizes innovation and welfare. Subse-
quent studies nd that strengthening patent protection in various forms does
not necessarily increase innovation and may even stie it. Examples of these
studies include Horowitz and Lai (1996) on patent length, ODonoghue and
Zweimuller (2004) on leading breadth and patentability requirement, Koleda
(2004) on patentability requirement, and Furukawa (2007) and Horii and
Iwaisako (2007) on patent protection against imitation.9 The present study
di¤ers from these studies by (i) analyzing a di¤erent patent-policy lever (i.e.,
the prot-division rule between sequential innovators) and (ii) emphasizing
the asymmetric e¤ects of patent protection on vertical and horizontal inno-
vation.10 In other words, rather than analyzing the e¤ects of patent policy
on the level of innovation as is common in the literature, we consider a much
less explored question that is the e¤ects of patent policy on the allocation of
R&D inputs.
Cozzi (2001) analyzes patent protection in the form of intellectual ap-
propriability (i.e., the ability of an innovator to patent her invention in the
presence of spying activities) in a quality-ladder model. Cozzi and Spinesi
(2006) extend this analysis into a model with both vertical and horizontal
innovation. In their model, spying activities are targeted only at quality im-
provement. Therefore, strengthening intellectual appropriability stimulates
vertical innovation (at the expense of horizontal innovation) and increases
long-run growth because horizontal innovation only has a level e¤ect in their
model for removing scale e¤ects. In contrast, long-run growth depends on
both vertical and horizontal innovation in the present study,11 and hence, the
asymmetric e¤ects of prot division on vertical and horizontal innovation give
9Also, a recent study by Kiedaisch (2009) shows that in a product-variety model with
hierarchical preferences, the innovation-maximizing level of patent protection may depend
on the income distribution.
10ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004) also consider a model with both vertical and hor-
izontal innovation in their appendix. However, their focus is on the e¤ects of patentability
requirement and leading breadth, and they did not analyze the e¤ects of alternative prot-
division rules in the presence of vertical and horizontal innovation.
11See footnotes (12) and (25) for a discussion on the issue of scale e¤ects in R&D-based
growth models.
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rise to a growth-maximizing prot-division rule.
Acs and Sanders (2009) and Cozzi and Galli (2009) also analyze the di-
vision of prot between innovators. Acs and Sanders (2009) analyze the
separation between invention and commercialization in a variety-expanding
model while Cozzi and Galli (2009) consider basic research and applied re-
search in a quality-ladder model. In these studies, each invention (i.e., a
new variety or a quality improvement) is created in a two-step innovation
process; therefore, there exists a growth-maximizing division of prot that
balances between the incentives of the rst and second innovators of each
invention. The present study di¤ers from these studies by analyzing the di-
vision of prot between sequential innovators within the same industry (in
which every innovator is rstly an entrant and then becomes an incumbent).
Also, we consider a model that features both vertical and horizontal innova-
tion. We nd that frontloading (backloading) the income stream along the
quality ladder stimulates vertical (horizontal) innovation, and it is the inter-
action of these two types of innovation that gives rise to a growth-maximizing
prot-division rule in this study.
This study also relates to Acemoglu (2009), who shows that under the
current patent system, the equilibrium diversity of innovation is insu¢ cient.
In other words, innovators have too much incentive to invest in R&D on
improving existing products but too little incentive to invest in R&D on
developing new products that may become useful in the future. Acemoglu
suggests that increasing the diversity of researchers could be a partial remedy
against this problem of insu¢ cient diversity. The present study suggests
another possible solution that is to increase the share of prot assigned to
the pioneering inventor of a product. In this case, there will be a reallocation
of research inputs from vertical innovation (i.e., R&D on existing products)
to horizontal innovation (i.e., R&D on new products).
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
model. Section 3 denes the equilibrium and characterizes the equilibrium
allocation. Section 4 considers the growth and welfare e¤ects of the prot-
division rule. Section 5 calibrates the model and simulates the transition
dynamics to provide a quantitative analysis. The nal section concludes.
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2 A simple model of horizontal and vertical
innovation
To consider both vertical and horizontal innovation in an R&D-based growth
model,12 we modify the Grossman-Helpman (1991) quality-ladder model by
endogenizing the number of varieties in the economy.13 Furthermore, to
consider the division of prot between sequential innovators along the quality
ladder, we assume that each entrant (i.e., the most recent innovator) infringes
the patent of the incumbent (i.e., the previous innovator). As a result of
this patent infringement, the entrant has to transfer a share s 2 [0; 1] of her
prot to the incumbent. However, with vertical innovation, every innovators
patent would eventually be infringed by the next innovation, and she can
then extract a share s of prot from the next entrant. This formulation
of prot division between sequential innovators originates from ODonoghue
and Zweimuller (2004). As for horizontal innovation, the invention of a new
variety does not infringe any patent, so that a variety inventor does not
have to share her prot but maintains the rights to extract prot from the
next entrant. Given that the Grossman-Helpman model is well-studied, we
will describe the familiar features briey to conserve space and discuss new
features (i.e., variety expansion and the division of prot) in details.
2.1 Households
There is a unit continuum of identical households. Their lifetime utility is
given by
U =
1Z
0
e t ln ctdt, (1)
12See, also, Dinopoulos and Thompson (1999a, 1999b), Howitt (1999), Jones (1999), Li
(2000), Peretto (1998, 1999), Peretto and Smulders (2002), Segerstrom (2000) and Young
(1998). The focus of these studies is on the removal of scale e¤ects in R&D-based growth
models. Given that scale e¤ect is not the focus of this study, we normalize the supply of
skilled labor to unity to set aside this issue.
13See, also, Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Segerstrom et al. (1990) for other pioneering
studies on the quality-ladder growth model.
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where  > 0 is discount rate, and ct is the consumption index at time t. The
consumption index is dened as 14
ct  exp
0@ ntZ
0
ln yt(i)di
1A . (2)
(2) shows that the households derive utility by consuming a continuum of
products yt(i). In Grossman and Helpman (1991), there is a unit continuum
of these products. In the present study, we endogenize the number of varieties
by allowing for horizontal innovation. nt is the number of active varieties
that are consumed by households at time t, and its law of motion is given by
:
n

t =
:
nt   nt . (3)
nt is the total number of varieties that have been invented in the past, and
:
nt is the number of newly invented varieties at time t. We follow Grossman
and Lai (2004) to allow for the possibility that an invented variety becomes
obsolete at some point. For tractability, we assume that each active variety
i 2 [0; nt ] at time t faces the same probability  > 0 to become permanently
obsolete.15
Households maximize (1) subject to a sequence of budget constraints
given by
:
at = rtat + wh;t + wl;tL 
ntZ
0
pt(i)yt(i)di. (4)
at is the value of assets owned by households, and rt is the rate of return.
Households inelastically supply one unit of high-skill labor for R&D and
L > 1 units of low-skill labor for production.16 The wage rates for high-
skill and low-skill labors are wh;t and wl;t respectively. pt(i) is the price of
14In their appendix, ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004) also consider this Cobb-Douglas
specication, which is similar to the CES specication in Howitt (1999) and Segerstrom
(2000) except for the di¤erent elasticity of substitution across varieties. In this study,
we focus on the Cobb-Douglas aggregator which enables us to compute the consumption
indexs transition path along which the arrival rate of innovation varies.
15Due to the quality distribution across varieties, the model would become considerably
more complicated if we allow the obsolescence rate to depend on the varietys age.
16In Grossman and Helpman (1991), a homogenous type of labor is allocated between
R&D and production. In reality, R&D engineers and scientists often have a high level of
education. Given that this model features two R&D sectors involving the allocation of
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product i at time t. If we denote t as the Hamiltonian co-state variable,
then householdsintratemporal optimality condition is
pt(i)yt(i) = 1=t (5)
for i 2 [0; nt ], and the intertemporal optimality condition is
rt =  
:
t=t. (6)
2.2 Production
There is a continuum of active varieties i 2 [0; nt ] that are consumed by
households at time t. The production function for the most recent innovator
in industry i is
yt(i) = z
qt(i)lt(i). (7)
The parameter z > 1 is the step size of each productivity improvement,
and qt(i) is the number of productivity improvements that have occurred in
industry i as of time t. lt(i) is the number of low-skill production workers
employed in industry i. Given zqt(i), the marginal cost of production for the
most recent innovator in industry i is
mct(i) = wl;t=z
qt(i). (8)
Notice that we here adopt a "cost reducing" view of vertical innovation
following Peretto (1998, 1999) and Peretto and Smulders (2002).17 In each
high-skill labor, we naturally distinguish between high-skill labor for R&D and low-skill
labor for production. However, it is useful to note that our main result (i.e., an increase in
s increases horizontal innovation but decreases vertical innovation) carries over to a setting
with homogenous labor that is allocated across production, vertical R&D and horizontal
R&D.
17It is useful to note that cost reduction is isomorphic to quality improvement in these
studies as well as in the current framework. To see this, the reader could easily reinter-
pret yt(i) as the consumption of the latest version, qt(i), of product i, along the lines of
Grossman and Helpman (1991), that is by assuming ln ct 
0B@ n

tZ
0
ln
qt(i)X
j=0
zjyt(i)di
1CA, with
consumption good {s production function given by yt(i) = lt(i). Clearly, the prot func-
tion (10) would follow directly from Bertrand competition, instead of the no longer valid
(8) and (9).
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industry that has at least two generations of innovation, the most recent
innovator infringes the previous innovators patent. As a result of this patent
infringement, the most recent innovator pays a licensing fee by transferring
a share s of her prot to the previous innovator. We follow ODonoghue
and Zweimuller (2004) to consider an exogenous prot-division rule.18 This
prot-division rule can be interpreted as the outcome of a bargaining game,
in which the bargaining power of each side is inuenced by patent policy.
Therefore, it is not an unrealistic assumption to treat s as a policy parameter.
ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004) are interested in the e¤ects of leading
breadth on R&D and economic growth through the consolidation of market
power that enables the most recent innovator and the previous innovator to
consolidate their market power and charge a higher markup. We do not adopt
this formulation here for three reasons. Firstly, the collusion between innova-
tors may be prohibited by antitrust laws. Secondly, the licensing agreement
only allows the most recent innovator to produce, but it may not prevent the
previous innovator from selling her products at a lower price. As a result, the
previous innovator may have the incentives to continue selling her products
and undercut the markup. Thirdly, we want to focus on the prot-division
e¤ect (instead of the markup e¤ect) of patent protection in this study. Given
these considerations, we assume that the most recent innovator and the pre-
vious innovator engage in the usual Bertrand competition as in Grossman
and Helpman (1991). The prot-maximizing price for the most recent inno-
vator is a constant markup (given by the step size z) over her own marginal
cost in (8).19
pt(i) = z(wl;t=z
qt(i)). (9)
Given (7) - (9), the amount of monopolistic prot generated by the most
18ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004) consider the more general case in which the current
innovator may infringe the patents of multiple previous innovators. For the purpose of the
present study, it is su¢ cient to demonstrate the asymmetric e¤ects of the prot-division
rule on vertical and horizontal innovation by considering the simple case of prot division
between the entrant and the incumbent.
19Li (2001) considers a CES version of (2) without horizontal innovation. In this case,
the monopolistic markup is determined by either the quality step size or the elasticity
of substitution depending on whether innovation is drastic or non-drastic. Without loss
of generality, we focus on non-drastic innovation as in the original Grossman-Helpman
model.
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recent innovation is
t(i) = (z   1)wl;tlt(i) =

z   1
z

1
t
, (10)
where the second equality is obtained by using (5), (7) and (9). Due to
prot division, the most recent innovator obtains (1 s)t while the previous
innovator obtains st. The above discussion implicitly assumes that the
most recent innovation and the second-most recent innovation are owned by
di¤erent rms (i.e., the Arrow replacement e¤ect). In Lemma 1, we show
that the Arrow replacement e¤ect is indeed present in this quality-ladder
model with prot division.20
Lemma 1 The Arrow replacement e¤ect is present.
Proof. See the Appendix A.
Finally, for a newly invented variety, we make the usual simplifying as-
sumption that the productivity of labor in each new variety21 is randomly
drawn from the existing distribution of active products i 2 [0; nt ]. We also
assume that a variety inventor can only patent the most advanced technol-
ogy. Given that the lower-productivity production methods are unpatented,
Bertrand competition drives the markup down to z as well.22 However, be-
cause there is no previous patentholder in the newly created industry, the
variety inventor obtains the entire  until the next productivity improvement
occurs, and then she can extract s from the entrant.
20Cozzi (2007) shows that the Arrow e¤ect is not necessarily inconsistent with the
empirical observation that incumbents often target innovation at their own industries.
Under this interpretation, the incumbentschoice of R&D is simply indeterminate, so that
the aggregate economy behaves as if innovation is targeted only by entrants. See also Etro
(2004, 2008) for an interesting analysis on innovation by incumbents with a rst-mover
advantage.
21Or the quality of each new variety, in the equivalent quality ladder interpretation
explained above.
22In the alternative case of drastic innovation, a new variety inventor and the most
recent innovator for an existing variety would also choose the same equilibrium markup
that is determined by the elasticity of substitution.
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2.3 Vertical innovation
Denote v2;t(i) as the value of the patent held by the second-most recent
innovator in industry i. Because t(i) = t for i 2 [0; nt ] from (10), v2;t(i) =
v2;t in a symmetric equilibrium (i.e., an equal arrival rate of innovation across
industries).23 In this case, the familiar no-arbitrage condition for v2;t is
rtv2;t = st +
:
v2;t   ( + t)v2;t. (11)
The left-hand side of (11) is the return on this asset. The right-hand side
of (11) is the sum of (i) the prot st received by the patentholder, (ii) the
potential capital gain
:
v2;t, and (iii) the expected capital loss due to obsoles-
cence v2;t and creative destruction tv2;t, where t is the Poisson arrival rate
of innovation in the industry. As for the value of the patent held by the most
recent innovator, the no-arbitrage condition for v1;t is
rtv1;t = (1  s)t + :v1;t   ( + t)v1;t + tv2;t. (12)
The intuition behind (12) is the same as (11) except for the addition of the
last term. When the next quality improvement occurs, the most recent inno-
vator becomes the second-most recent innovator and hence her net expected
capital loss is t(v1;t   v2;t).
There is a unit continuum of vertical-R&D rms indexed by j 2 [0; 1]
doing research on vertical innovation in each industry i. They hire high-skill
labor hq;t(j) to create productivity improvements, and the expected prot of
rm j is
q;t(j) = v1;tt(j)  wh;thq;t(j). (13)
The rm-level arrival rate of innovation is
t(j) =
 
'q;thq;t(j), (14)
where
 
'q;t is the productivity of vertical R&D at time t. The zero-expected-
prot condition for vertical R&D is
v1;t
 
'q;t = wh;t. (15)
23We follow the standard approach in the literature to focus on the symmetric equi-
librium. See Cozzi (2005) and Cozzi et al. (2007) for a discussion on the symmetric
equilibrium in the quality-ladder growth model.
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We follow Jones and Williams (2000) to assume that
 
'q;t = 'q(hq;t)
q 1,
where 'q > 0 is a productivity parameter for vertical R&D and q 2 (0; 1)
captures the usual negative externality in intratemporal duplication within
each industry. In equilibrium, the industry-level arrival rate of innovation
equals the aggregate of rm-level arrival rates. Therefore, the arrival rate of
vertical innovation for each variety is t = 'q(hq;t)
q .
2.4 Horizontal innovation
Denote vn;t as the value of inventing a new variety. The no-arbitrage condi-
tion for vn;t is
rtvn;t = t +
:
vn;t   ( + t)vn;t + tv2;t. (16)
The only di¤erence between (12) and (16) is that a variety inventor captures
t while a quality innovator captures (1 s)t. There is also a unit continuum
of horizontal-R&D rms indexed by k 2 [0; 1] doing research on creating new
varieties. They hire high-skill labor hn;t(k) to create inventions, and the
prot of rm k is
n;t(k) = vn;t
:
nt(k)  wh;thn;t(k). (17)
The number of inventions created by rm k is
:
nt(k) =
 
'n;thn;t(k), (18)
where
 
'n;t is the productivity of horizontal R&D at time t. The zero-prot
condition for horizontal R&D is
vn;t
 
'n;t = wh;t. (19)
Again,
 
'n;t = 'n(hn;t)
n 1, where 'n > 0 is a productivity parameter for
variety-expanding R&D and n 2 (0; 1) captures the duplication externality
in horizontal innovation. The total number of inventions created at time t is
:
nt = 'n(hn;t)
n . (20)
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3 Decentralized equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path fyt(i); lt; hq;t; hn;t; rt; pt(i); wl;t; wh;t; vn;t; v1;t; v2;tg,
t  0. Also, at each instant of time,
 households maximize utility taking frt; pt(i); wl;t; wh;tg as given;
 production rms produce fyt(i)g and choose fpt(i)g to maximize prot
taking fwl;tg as given;
 vertical-innovation rms choose fhq;tg to maximize expected prot tak-
ing fwh;t; v1;tg as given;
 horizontal-innovation rms choose fhn;tg to maximize prot taking
fwh;t; vn;tg as given;
 the low-skill labor market clears such that nt lt = L; and
 the high-skill labor market clears such that hn;t + nthq;t = 1.
3.1 Stationary equilibrium
We focus on a stationary equilibrium, in which the number of active varieties
is constant. Substituting (20) into (3) yields
:
n

t = 'n(hn;t)
n nt . Therefore,:
n

t = 0 implies that
n =
:
n= = 'n(hn)
n=. (21)
The number of production workers per variety is
l =
L
n
=
L
'n(hn)
n
. (22)
Let us choose low-skill labor as the numeraire (i.e., wl;t = 1 for all t). Then,
combining (5), (7) and (9) shows that  is constant in the stationary equi-
librium implying that r =  from (6) and
:
t=t = 0 from (10). Applying the
stationary equilibrium conditions on (11), (12) and (16) yields
v1 =
(1  s) + v2
+  + 
=

+  + 

1  s+ s 
+  + 

, (23)
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vn =
 + v2
+  + 
=

+  + 

1 + s

+  + 

. (24)
(24) shows that the value of a new variety vn is increasing in s for a given
innovation rate  because a larger s allows the variety inventor to extract
more prot from the next innovator. In contrast, (23) shows that the value
of a productivity improvement v1 is decreasing in s for a given  because
of the backloading e¤ect =( +  + ) < 1. In other words, delaying the
income stream reduces its expected present value due to discounting  and
the possibility of obsolescence .24
Substituting (23) and (24) into v1
 
'q = vn
 
'n from (15) and (19) yields
(hn)
1 n =
 
'n
'q
+  + (1 + s)'q(hq)
q
(1  s)(+ ) + 'q(hq)q
!
(hq)
1 q . (25)
We will refer to (25) as the arbitrage condition. To close the model, we
manipulate hn;t + nthq;t = 1 to derive
(1  hn)
'n(hn)
n
= hq. (26)
We will refer to (26) as the resource constraint. The equilibrium allocation
of high-skill labor is implicitly determined by solving (25) and (26). Taking
the total di¤erentials of (26) yields
dhn
dhq
=  

1  hn
hn + n(1  hn)

hn
hq
< 0. (27)
In other words, the resource constraint describes a negative relationship be-
tween hn and hq. As for the arbitrage condition in (25), hq has opposing
e¤ects on the arbitrage condition. On one hand, an increase in hq decreases
 
'q. For a given value of vn=v1, hn must rise and
 
'n must fall to balance
v1
 
'q = vn
 
'n . On the other hand, a larger hq increases  and decreases
24At the rst glance, the asymmetric e¤ect of s on vn and v1 appears to crucially depend
on the assumption that a new variety does not infringe any patent. However, this is not
true. Suppose a new variety infringes with a probabiliy . Then, it is easy to see that
so long as  < =( +  + ), vn is still increasing in s for a given . Therefore, the
key assumption here is that horizontal innovation carries a much smaller chance of patent
infringement than vertical innovation.
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vn=v1 when s > 0. If this latter e¤ect is strong enough, it may lead to a
decrease in hn. Taking the total di¤erentials of (25) yields
dhn
dhq
=
1
1  n
 
1  q   q
s2(+ )
+  + (1 + s)'q(hq)
q
'q(hq)
q
(1  s)(+ ) + 'q(hq)q
!
hn
hq
.
(28)
(28) shows that dhn=dhq must be positive when hq equals zero or becomes
su¢ ciently large. However, at intermediate values of hq, it is possible for
dhn=dhq to be negative. In this case, there may be multiple equilibria. To
rule out multiple equilibrium, which is not the focus of this study, Lemma 2
derives the parameter condition under which (28) is always positive, which
is su¢ cient to ensure that the stationary equilibrium is unique. Lets dene
a parameter threshold q  [1  0:5s2=(1 +
p
1  s2)] 2 [0:5; 1].
Lemma 2 If q < q, then dhn=dhq > 0 in (28) 8hq > 0.
Proof. See the Appendix A.
Figure 1 plots (25) and (26) in the (hq; hn) space. The resource con-
straint (RC) is negatively sloped while the arbitrage condition (AC) is pos-
itively sloped given the parameter condition in Lemma 2. Therefore, if an
equilibrium exists, it must be unique. Also, a larger s increases the market
value of a new variety and decreases that of a quality improvement; con-
sequently, horizontal R&D hn rises and vertical R&D hq falls. Given this
intuitive result (summarized in Proposition 1), the next section uses the
growth-theoretic framework to analyze the e¤ects of the prot-division rule
on economic growth and social welfare.
Proposition 1 Given q <
 
q, there exists a unique equilibrium (hq; hn).
The equilibrium hn(s) is increasing in s while hq(s) is decreasing in s.
Proof. At hq = 0, hn = 0 in (25) and hn = 1 in (26). As hq approaches
innity, hn in (26) approaches zero. Therefore, (25) and (26) must cross
exactly once given Lemma 2. An increase in s shifts up (25) in the (hq; hn)
space leading to an increase in hn and a decrease in hq. See Figure 1.
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4 E¤ects on growth and welfare
In this section, we analyze the e¤ects of prot division between sequential
innovators on economic growth and social welfare. We rstly derive the
growth-maximizing prot-division rule and then the welfare-maximizing rule.
Finally, we compare them and characterize the condition under which one is
above the other.
4.1 The growth-maximizing prot-division rule
To derive the balanced growth rate of the consumption index, we substitute
(7) into (2) to obtain
ln ct =
nZ
0
(qt(i) ln z + ln l(i)) di =
0@n tZ
0
d
1A ln z + n ln l. (29)
The second equality of (29) is obtained by (i) applying symmetry l(i) = l
from (10), (ii) normalizing q0(i) = 0 for all i, and (iii) using the law of
large numbers that implies
nZ
0
qt(i)di = n

tZ
0
d .25 Di¤erentiating (29) with
respect to time yields the balanced growth rate of the consumption index
given by
g 
:
ct
ct
= n ln z, (30)
where the steady-state number of varieties is n = 'n(hn)
n= and the arrival
rate of productivity improvement in each industry is  = 'q(hq)
q . To see
why the equilibrium growth rate depends on the number of varieties, lets
consider the symmetric case of (2) given by ln ct = n ln yt(i). Di¤erentiating
ln ct with respect to time yields g = n
:
yt(i)=yt(i). In other words, for a given
quality growth rate of each variety, increasing the number of varieties causes
the aggregate consumption index to grow at a higher rate.26
25Note that at each instant of time, the average quality of new varieties is the same as
the average quality of obsolete varieties because they are drawn from the same quality
distribution. In Appendix B, we derive an expression for ln ct when nt varies over time.
26It is useful to note that this result of horizontal innovation a¤ecting long-run growth
does not rely on a stationary number of varieties. In the case of a growing number of
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Given that increasing s has a positive e¤ect on n and a negative e¤ect on
, there is generally a growth-maximizing prot-division rule. Di¤erentiating
the log of (30) with respect to s yields
1
g
@g
@s
=
n
hn
@hn
@s
+
q
hq
@hq
@s
, (31)
where @hn=@s > 0 and @hq=@s < 0 from Proposition 1. From (27), we can
derive
1
hn
dhn
ds
=   1
hq

1  hn
hn + n(1  hn)

dhq
ds
. (32)
Substituting (32) into (31) yields
1
g
@g
@s
=   1
hq

n(1  hn)
hn + n(1  hn)
  q

dhq
ds
. (33)
Therefore,
@g
@s
> 0, hn(s) <  
n(1  q)
q + n(1  q)
. (34)
In order to have a better understanding of (34), we can maximize (30) by
directly choosing hn and hq subject to (26). Substituting  = 'q(hq)
q
and hq = (1   hn)=n into (30) yields g = (n)1 q(1   hn)q'q ln z, where
n = 'n(hn)
n= from (21). It is easy to show that the growth-maximizing
hn is given by , which is increasing in n and decreasing in q. In other
words, as horizontal R&D exhibits a less severe degree of decreasing returns
to scale (i.e., a larger n) or as vertical R&D exhibits a more severe degree of
decreasing returns to scale (i.e., a smaller q), the economy should allocate
more research labor to horizontal R&D for the purpose of growth maximiza-
tion. Therefore, the growth-maximizing prot-division rule sg  arg max g(s)
is characterized by moving the equilibrium hn(sg) to as close to  as possible.
Proposition 2 If an interior growth-maximizing prot-division rule sg ex-
ists, it is implicitly dened by hn(sg) = . If hn(0) > , then sg = 0. If
hn(1) < , then sg = 1.
varieties, horizontal innovation would still have an e¤ect on long-run growth if the long-
run variety growth rate is endogenous. However, it is common for studies on R&D-based
growth models with vertical and horizontal innovation to assume a setup in which the
long-run variety growth rate is equal to the exogenous population growth rate for the
purpose of eliminating scale e¤ects.
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Proof. Note (33) and (34). Also, recall that hn(s) is increasing in s.
4.2 The welfare-maximizing prot-division rule
To derive the steady-state welfare,27 we normalize the time index such that
time 0 is the instant when the economy reaches the stationary equilibrium.
In this case, (1) becomes 28
U =
1


ln c0 +
g


=
1


n ln l +
n ln z


, (35)
where l = L=n is decreasing in s. In other words, social welfare is determined
by the growth rate g as well as the initial level of consumption ln c0. Because
of this additional level e¤ect, the welfare-maximizing prot-division rule is
generally di¤erent from the growth-maximizing rule. When s increases, it
creates a positive e¤ect as well as a negative e¤ect on ln c0 = n ln l. By
increasing hn and hence n, a larger s increases the number of varieties avail-
able for consumption on one hand and decreases the output per variety on
the other. Di¤erentiating ln c0 with respect to s yields
@ ln c0
@s
= (ln l   1) @n

@s
, (36)
where n = 'n(hn)
n= so that @n=@s > 0. Therefore,
@ ln c0
@s
> 0, hn(s) <  

L
'ne
1=n
, (37)
where e = exp(1). In other words, the level of hn that maximizes initial
consumption is given by : (22) shows that for a given (hn)n , a larger
27In this section, we restrict our attention to steady-state welfare. A more complete
welfare analysis would take into account the evolution of householdsutility during the
transitional path from the initial state to the steady state, and we will perform this analysis
numerically in the next section. However, such an analysis is analytically much more
complicated. Therefore, we rstly follow the usual treatment in the literature to derive
the optimal patent policy that maximizes steady-state welfare. See, for example, Acemoglu
and Akcigit (2008), Futagami and Iwaisako (2003, 2007) and Grossman and Lai (2004).
28(35) is based on the normalization that q0(i) = 0 for all i. If we modify this normaliza-
tion to q0(i) = q > 0 for all i, then there will be an extra term nq ln z inside the bracket
in (35). Therefore, q > 0 has the same e¤ect as a larger L on steady-state welfare.
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L='n increases l, so that hn can be larger while initial consumption still
rises.
Di¤erentiating (35) with respect to s yields
@U
@s
=
1


@ ln c0
@s
+
1

@g
@s

. (38)
Denote the welfare-maximizing prot-division rule by su  arg maxU(s). In
Proposition 3, we show that
su  sg ,   . (39)
Intuitively, the welfare-maximizing hn balances between the growth e¤ect
and the initial-level e¤ect on welfare. Therefore, it is a weighted average of
 and . If   , then the welfare-maximizing hn is above the growth-
maximizing hn, and vice versa. Given that hn(s) is increasing in s,   
would also imply su  sg.
Proposition 3 The welfare-maximizing prot-division rule su is below (above)
the growth-maximizing prot-division rule sg if  is smaller (larger) than .
Proof. From (34), we know that @g=@s = 0 at hn(s) = . From (37), we
know that @ ln c0=@s = 0 at hn(s) = . Suppose  = . Then, (38) shows
that su = sg. If   (), then su  ()sg because hn(s) is increasing in s.
Finally, we discuss how the supply of unskilled labor L a¤ects the welfare-
maximizing prot-division rule. From (25) and (26), we see that neither the
arbitrage condition nor the resource constraint depend on L. Therefore,
the supply of unskilled labor has no e¤ect on the growth-maximizing prot-
division rule. Furthermore, given that  is increasing in L, it must be the
case that su is increasing in L. Intuitively, a larger supply of unskilled labor
increases output per variety and hence magnies the positive e¤ect of n
on the initial level of consumption ln c0 = n lnL   n lnn through the
term n lnL. Given that the welfare-maximizing su is increasing in L while
the growth-maximizing sg is independent of L, we have the following result
illustrated in Figure 2. Lets rstly dene a threshold value of L given by
L  'nne=.
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Corollary 1 If L is smaller (larger) than L, then su is below (above) sg.
Proof. This is an implication of Proposition 3 because L  L  'nne=
is equivalent to   .
5 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we calibrate the model to illustrate quantitatively the growth
and welfare e¤ects of the prot-division rule. We rstly evaluate the e¤ects
of increasing s from 0 to 1 on steady-state welfare. Then, we simulate the
transition dynamics to compute the complete welfare changes. Specically,
we consider two types of policy reform (i) an immediate increase in s and (ii)
a gradual increase in s.
5.1 Steady-state welfare
For the structural parameters, we either consider conventional parameter
values or calibrate their values by using empirical moments in the US before
the patent-policy reform in 1982. For the discount rate , we set it to 0.03.
For the R&D externality parameters q and n, we consider the symmetric
case of  = q = n and follow Jones and Williams (2000) to consider a value
of  = 0:5.29 Similarly, we consider the symmetric case of ' = 'q = 'n for
R&D productivity as in Gersbach et al. (2009).30 To calibrate the values of
the remaining structural parameters ', , z and L, we use the following four
29While Jones and Williams (2000) use the empirical estimates of the social return to
R&D to show that a lower bound for  is 0:5, Kortums (1992) estimated value for a
parameter similar to  is 0.2. Therefore, we use  = 0:5 as our benchmark.
30In this calibration exercise, we consider the benchmark case of symmetric R&D pa-
rameters because a more detailed calibration requires disaggregate data on vertical and
horizontal R&D. Unfortunately, we do not know of such data. However, if we follow
the interpretation of Aghion and Howitt (1996) to treat horizontal R&D mainly as basic
research and vertical R&D as applied research, then we can consider the data on basic
R&D as a benchmark. According to OECD: Main Science and Technology Indicators,
basic R&D is about 0.33% of US GDP in 1982. In our models calibration, about 26% of
high-skill labor is allocated to horizontal R&D implying that horizontal R&D as a share
of GDP is about 0.39%. Therefore, the calibration based on symmetric R&D parameters
is roughly in line with the data.
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empirical moments (i) the arrival rate of vertical innovation, (ii) the average
growth rate of total factor productivity, (iii) R&D as a share of GDP, and
(iv) the ratio of R&D scientists and engineers to labor force. For (i), we
follow Acemoglu and Akcigit (2008) to consider an innovation-arrival rate
of  = 0:33. For (ii), we consider a value of g = 1:5%. For (iii), we use
a value of R&D=GDP = wh=(wh + wlL + n) = 1:5%. For (iv), there
were 711.8 thousands full-time equivalent R&D scientists and engineers in
the US in 1982,31 and there were 110.2 millions people in the US labor force
in 1982. Given these empirical moments, we have the following calibrated
values f'; ; z; Lg = f0:64; 0:12; 1:02; 153:8g.
Table 1: E¤ects of s on growth and welfare
s 0:0 0:2 0:4 0:6 0:8 1:0
 0:33 0:30 0:27 0:25 0:22 0:18
g 1:500% 1:513% 1:505% 1:474% 1:413% 1:301%
U 388:1 417:4 445:5 473:0 500:8 530:1
Table 1 shows that an increase in s would stie vertical innovation by
decreasing the arrival rate of productivity improvements. Despite the in-
crease in horizontal innovation, the overall growth rate eventually decreases.
This nding is consistent with the recent concerns about patent protection
stiing the innovation process. However, Table 1 also suggests an interesting
possibility that despite the lower growth rate, steady-state welfare U in (35)
increases due to the higher rate of horizontal innovation.3233 This illustrative
exercise suggests the importance of taking into consideration the stimulating
e¤ect of s on horizontal innovation for a proper welfare analysis.
31This data is obtained from National Science Foundation. See the number of full-time
equivalent R&D scientists and engineers in the US.
32It is useful to note that this nding of a welfare gain is robust to the normalization of
q0(i) = 0 for all i. In the case of q0(i) = q > 0 for all i, the welfare gain would have been
more substantial because q > 0 has the same e¤ect as a larger L as discussed before.
33We have also considered a hypothetical value of s = 1:1 and nd that welfare continues
to increase in s. This result also applies to the subsequent results with transition dynamics.
However, a potential problem with s > 1 is that if patent infringment occurs only when
an entrant launches her product in the market (rather than when she comes up with the
innovation), she may not have the incentives to launch her high-quality product to avoid
paying the penality to the incumbent. If every subsequent entrant acts in this way, then
vertical innovation would come to a halt.
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5.2 Immediate patent reform
In the previous section, we evaluated the e¤ects of an increase in s on steady-
state welfare. However, such an analysis neglects the welfare changes during
the transition path. Therefore, in this section, we simulate the transition
dynamics of the model.34 Given the transition path of the consumption
index, we can then evaluate the complete welfare e¤ects of an immediate
increase in s from s = 0 to s 2 f0:2; 0:4; 0:6; 0:8; 1:0g. Comparing Tables
1 and 2, we see that increasing s would improve welfare even taking into
consideration transition dynamics. However, the magnitude of the welfare
improvement is smaller than in the case of steady-state welfare.
Table 2: Welfare e¤ects of an immediate increase in s
s 0:0 0:2 0:4 0:6 0:8 1:0
U(transition) 388:1 411:8 434:4 456:3 478:0 500:4
5.3 Gradual patent reform
In the previous section, we evaluated the welfare e¤ects of an immediate in-
crease in s. However, in the US, the patent reform may be more accurately
described as a gradual reform. For example, in 1982, the US Congress estab-
lished the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) as a centralized
appellate court for patent cases. "Over the next decade, in case after case,
the court signicantly broadened and strengthened the rights of patent hold-
ers."35 Furthermore, the Ginarte-Park index (described in Section 1) shows
that the strength of patent protection in the US gradually increases from 3.8
in 1975 to 4.9 in 1995.36
Table 3: Index of patent rights from Park (2008)
Year 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
United States 3:83 4:35 4:68 4:68 4:88 4:88 4:88
34See Appendix B for a description of the dynamic system and the numerical algorithm.
35Ja¤e and Lerner (2004, p. 9-10).
36The Ginarte-Park index is an aggregate measure of patent rights rather than a direct
measure of the prot-division rule. Although an empirical measure of "s" is not available,
the anecdotal evidence from Ja¤e and Lerner (2004) seems to suggest that it increases
gradually in the US rather than once and for all in the early 1980s.
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Therefore, in this section, we evaluate the welfare e¤ects of a gradual
increase in s from s = 0 to s 2 f0:2; 0:4; 0:6; 0:8; 1:0g. Following Cozzi and
Galli (2009), we consider a law of motion for st given by
:
st =  (s  st), (40)
where the parameter  2 (0; 1) determines the speed of the patent reform.
In the numerical exercise, we consider  = 0:05 for illustrative purposes.
Table 4 shows that a gradual increase in s would improve social welfare but
by a smaller magnitude than an immediate increase in s. Furthermore, the
welfare gain is increasing in  (i.e., increasing in the speed of reform). As  
approaches one, the welfare gain becomes the same as in Section 5.2.
Table 4: Welfare e¤ects of a gradual increase in s
s 0:0 0:2 0:4 0:6 0:8 1:0
U( = 0:05) 388:1 404:7 420:8 436:3 451:6 467:1
6 Conclusion
This study develops a simple growth model to shed some light on an often
debated question that is whether patent protection stimulates or sties in-
novation. We show that both sides of the argument are valid. Specically,
protecting incumbents at the expense of entrants would stimulate horizontal
innovation but stie vertical innovation, and the opposite occurs when en-
trants are protected against incumbents. Although the distinction between
vertical and horizontal innovation is blurred in reality, our point is still valid
in the sense that patent protection has asymmetric e¤ects on di¤erent types
of innovation that have di¤erent chances of patent infringement, and hence,
the traditional tradeo¤ of optimal patent protection needs to be modied to
take into account this asymmetric e¤ect of patent policy. In other words, the
optimal patent policy should be innovation-specic. If vertical (horizontal)
innovation is crucial to social welfare, then a more frontloading (backloading)
prot-division rule should be implemented. Furthermore, if we follow Aghion
and Howitt (1996) to treat horizontal R&D as basic research and vertical
R&D as applied research, then our nding implies that a gradual increase
in the bargaining power of the basic researchers could be welfare-improving,
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and this nding is consistent with the two-stage R&D analysis in Cozzi and
Galli (2009), who consider a transition to more upstream bargaining power.
Finally, in this study, we have considered a stylized growth model for an-
alytical tractability, and the numerical exercises are for illustrative purposes.
Therefore, it would be interesting for future studies to develop a more gen-
eral dynamic general-equilibrium model to obtain more precise quantitative
implications of strengthening patent protection.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. From (23), the value of a quality improvement
is v1 = ++

1  s+ s 
++

for a rm that does not own the previous
innovation. For an incumbent (i.e., a rm that owns the previous innovation),
the incremental value of a quality improvement is vI = ++

1 + s 
++

 
v2.37 The rst term in vI reects that the rms new product infringes its own
patent and hence it does not have to pay any licensing fee. The second term
(i.e.,  v2) reects that the incumbents old invention loses the opportunity to
extract prot from the new entrant. Substituting v2 = ++s into vI yields
vI = v1 for s 2 [0; 1], so that the incumbent is indi¤erent as to where to
target innovation. As a result, all the aggregate variables behave as if quality
improvement is targeted only by the entrants (i.e., the Arrow replacement
e¤ect).38
Proof of Lemma 2. Lets rstly dene a new variable x  'q(hq)q and
a new function
f(x)  1
+  + (1 + s)x

x
(1  s)(+ ) + x

. (A1)
Simple di¤erentiation yields
arg max f(x) = (+ )
r
1  s
1 + s
. (A2)
37To be consistent with the assumption of no market-power consolidation, an upper
bound of z is imposed on the markup, so that  is the same in v1 and vI . In the case
of market-power consolidation, the markup would be given by z2 regardless of whether or
not the two generations of quality improvement are owned by the same rm, so that 
would be the same in v1 and vI as well.
38This new interpretation of the Arrow e¤ect is developed by Cozzi (2007), who shows
that the incumbents current invention faces the same probability of being displaced re-
gardless of whether or not an incumbent targets innovation at her own industry. Un-
der the traditional interpretation (i.e., when an incumbent obtains a new invention,
she loses the value of the old invention), it should be v1 (instead of v2) that is sub-
stracted from vI . In this case, vI = ++

1 + s ++

  v1 = ++s, and hence vI
< v1 () s < bs  ++2(+)+ 2 [0:5; 1]. Therefore, when s < bs, quality improvement is
targeted by entrants only, so that the Arrow replacement e¤ect is again present.
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Given that dhn=dhq in (28) is decreasing in f(x), maximizing f(x) is equiv-
alent to minimizing the bracketed term in (28). Substituting (A2) into (28)
yields
dhn
dhq
=
1
1  n

1  q   q
s2
2  s2 + 2p1  s2

hn
hq
. (A3)
Manipulating (A3) shows that q < [1 0:5s2=(1+
p
1  s2)] 2 [0:5; 1] implies
dhn=dhq > 0 in (28) for any value of hq > 0.
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Appendix B: Transition dynamics
The system of equations that characterizes the dynamics of the model is
as follows.
:
n

t = 'n(hn;t)
n   nt (B1)
:
t=t =   rt (B2)
:
v2;t = (rt + t + )v2;t   st (B3)
:
v1;t = (rt + t + )v1;t   tv2;t   (1  s)t (B4)
:
vn;t = (rt + t + )vn;t   tv2;t   t (B5)
t =

z   1
z

1
t
(B6)
t = 'q(hq;t)
q (B7)
v1;t'q(hq;t)
q 1 = vn;t'n(hn;t)
n 1 (B8)
hn;t + n

thq;t = 1 (B9)
nt lt = L (B10)
t = (z   1)wl;tlt =

z   1
z

1
t
=) zwl;tlt = 1
t
(B11)
Finally, we choose lt as the numeraire by setting wl;t = 1. The endogenous
variables in this system are fnt ; t; v2;t; v1;t; vn;t; t; t; hq;t; hn;t; lt; rtg.
In all our numerical simulations, in order to simulate the dynamic tran-
sition from one steady state to another, we rst compute the initial steady
state and the nal steady state, associated with the initial and nal level
of s; then we discretize all the di¤erential equations in system (B1)-(B11),
and plug them as well as the remaining equation restrictions in a .mod le,
which allows Dynare to apply its deterministic routines, needed to compute
the dynamic rational expectations equilibrium transition from the initial to
the nal steady state. Since Dynare also analyses the eigenvalues of the
Jacobian matrix at the nal steady state, while simulating the transitional
path we always make sure that in all our simulations the conditions for the
determinacy of the steady state are satised, that is the number of stable
eigenvalues is equal to the number of predetermined variables. Hence, all the
transitional paths we have obtained are along the unique equilibrium of the
economy analyzed.
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In order to calculate the complete change in welfare, we need to keep
track of the evolution of the consumption index.
ln ct =
ntZ
0
(qt(i) ln z + ln lt(i))di =
0@ ntZ
0
qt(i)di
1A ln z + nt ln lt. (B12)
Normalizing q0(i) = 0 for all i, we can re-express the level of aggregate
technology as
ntZ
0
qt(i)di =
tZ
0
nd +
tZ
0
:
n


0@ Z
0
d
1A d . (B13)
The rst term on the right hand side of (B13) is the accumulated number
of productivity improvements that have occurred from time 0 to time t.
The second term on the right hand side of (B13) is the change in aggregate
technology due to the introduction of new varieties net of obsolescence. Using
the data generated by Dynare, we could then compute the discretized version
of the welfare integral, which allowed the welfare experiments reported in the
tables of Section 5.
Notice that by normalizing q0(i) = 0 for all i, in light of (B13), we are
minimizing the e¤ect of
:
n

t on welfare. This proves the robustness of the wel-
fare comparisons in Tables 2 and 4. Given that nt increases from the initial
steady state to the new steady state in our numerical exercises, any alter-
native positive level of the q0(i)s would imply a higher transitional welfare
e¤ect of an increase in s.
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